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DOD health care costs are escalating rapidly. Managed care is one way to 
control costs effectively while maintaining, or increasing, quality and accessibility of 
care. The TRICARE Program has transformed CHAMPUS from being a fee-for-
service system to a managed care organization. DOD understands that to run a 
smaller more efficient health care system effectively, it must continue to pursue 
managed care. TRICARE must continually improve on health care delivery methods. 
This starts by implementing an effective, well-constructed contract. 
This thesis examines the unique features of the Tri-Service Coordinated Care 
(TRICARE), Managed Care Support (MCS) contracts. Specifically, it answers the 
question--What are the unique characteristics of the military's TRICARE MCS contracts, 
and are they functioning sufficiently to achieve the objectives of the TRICARE Program? 
In answering this question, the bid price adjustment (BPA) and risk sharing mechanisms are 
analyzed. The TRICARE Program is compared to past Military health care programs, and 
the considerations which led to the inclusion of the bid price adjustment (BP A) and risk 
sharing mechanisms are examined. Finally, a working-level perspective ofthe problems 
with these unique mechanisms is presented, and recommendations are made to improve the 
next generation ofTRICARE MCS contracts. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Today's military health care organizations are under extreme pressure to reduce. 
cost, while maintaining high quality medical care. The mission of the Military Health 
Services System (MHSS) is to ''provide top quality health services, whenever needed in 
support of military operations, and to members of the Armed Forces, their families, and 
others entitled to [Department ofDefense] DOD health care [Health Affairs-1995, p. 1]." 
This is no easy task in an era in which the discretionary portion of the Federal budget, 
specifically the military budget, is shrinking. 
The focus of this study is to analyze the unique features of the Tri-Service 
Coordinated Care (TRICARE) Managed Care Support (MCS) contracts. These contracts 
are a fixed-price type with a provision for a bid price adjustment (BP A) and a risk sharing 
mechanism. They cover active duty members, their family members, and military retirees. 
Active duty members, however, are only covered by the contracts to a limited degree 
because they are required to use military treatment facilities (MTFs) when available. 
Specifically, this thesis examines the health care considerations which led to the inclusion 
of the bid price adjustment (BPA) and risk sharing mechanisms foundm all of the 
TRTCARE MCS contracts. 
A. BACKGROUND 
During the last decade there has been mounting concern about the increasing 
growth rate ofhealth care expenditures in the United States and in the Department of 
Defense (DOD)[Braendel, pg 7]. This point is illustrated by the National Health Care 
Review Panel, headed by Hillary Clinton in 1992 and 1993, as well as test programs 
established by DOD. Between 1985 and 1995, budget expenditures for Medicare and 
Medicaid have increased at an average annual rate of ten percent and 15 percent, 
respectively [CBO 1996, p. 70]. Projections for the next decade indicate similar increases. 
Military health care spending has been growing at rates comparable to the Federal 
programs. Between 1986 and 1994, military health care expenditures increased at an 
average annual rate of9.34 percent [Doyle, Slide 21]. To put this into perspective, the 
Congressional Budget Office (CBO) projects that the economy will grow at an average 
rate of 2.1 percent per year and inflation will be around three percent per year between 
1997 and 2006 [CBO 1996, p.71]. The growth ofhealth care and other mandatory 
portions of the Federal budget coupled with the tightening of discretionary portions of the 
budget show that if the current trend of growth continues, health care will continue to 
consume a greater portion of the Federal budget, as well as the Defense budget. In fact, 
:from the early 1960s to 1992 health care costs have grown :from six percent to 14 percent 
of the gross domestic product (GDP) [Gatrell, pg 2]. Consequently, there is increasing 
concern about how to curb this growth rate. Furthermore, there has been tremendous 
pressure :from Congress to reorganize the Federal and Military Health Care systems since 
the mid 1980's [Marmor, pg 21-30]. 
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The Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs [OASD (HA)] 
states that the purpose of the TRICARE MCS contracts is to achieve the following goals: 
1. Improving beneficiary access to care; 
2. Assuring the security of a high quality,. consistent health care benefit for 
all MHSS beneficiaries, at low cost; 
3. Preserving choice for all non-active duty participants; and 
4. Containing overall DOD health care costs. [Health Affairs-1996, pg 5] 
Under TRICARE, the United States is divided into 12 health care regions (See 
Appendix), with seven MCS contracts covering the regions. This is a decentralized 
system in which each region has a lead agent, the Military Treatment Facility (MTF) with 
the highest ranking military commander within each region. Part of DOD's effort to 
reorganize the military's health care system has been to implement the seven TRICARE 
MCS contracts and push some of the decision making authority down to the lead agents 
[GAO-HEHS 94-145, pg 2-6]. 
Due to the size and complexity of the MCS contracts, they are being phased in 
over several years. To date, five of the seven contracts have been signed, with four 
performing health care delivery. Currently, the seventh contract is scheduled to start 
health care delivery in late 1997. After the seven original TRICARE MCS contracts are 
implemented, a second round, referred to as "the next generation of contracts," will begin. 
Preparation for and drafting of the next generation of contracts is underway at OASD 
(HA) and the TRICARE Support Office (TSO), with input for changes coming from 
many of the experienced regions, and ongoing studies discussed in Section C of this 
Chapter. 
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Even though the MCS contracts are being phased in over several years, contracts 
of this magnitude (over $12 billion for seven MCS contracts), providing every aspect of 
health care for an ever changing number of active duty personnel, family members, and 
retirees, are naturally very complicated legal documents. To help deal with the uncertainty 
inherent in such a gargantuan undertaking, the Government has incorporated several 
complex provisions. Due to the unique nature of the provisions, which have been created 
specially for the MCS contracts, Government administrative contracting officers (ACOs) 
are administering contract provisions with which they have had no previous experience. 
These provisions include, but are not limited to, the BP A, risk sharing, and the concept of 
resource sharing. As will be demonstrated later, it is nearly impossible to talk about one 
of these provisions without including the others. The application of these provisions has 
not been simple and has caused atypical problems for lead agents and contract 
administrative personnel. 
B. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
This thesis analyzes the primary question: What are the unique characteristics of 
the military's TRICARE MCS contracts, and are they functioning sufficiently to achieve 
the objectives of the TRICARE Program? To answer this primary research question, five 
subsidiary questions are addressed: 
(1) What is the objective of the TRICARE program, and how does the TRICARE 
program differ from past military health care programs? 
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(2) What challenges have ACOs, lead agents, and Contracting Officer's Technical 
Representatives (COTRs) encountered while administering the unique aspects of 
the TRICARE MCS contracts? 
(3) What are the Government's [experienced regional staffs, ASD (HA), and 
COTRs] analyses, suggestions, and critiques? 
( 4) What other contractual mechanisms might be used, or how might current 
mechanisms be tailored, to facilitate contract administration? 
(5) How may this analysis help improve future TRICARE MCS contracts? 
C. LITERATURE REVIEW AND METHODOLOGY 
This research effort investigates the unique provisions ofTRICARE MCS 
contracts and the incentives provided by these provisions. There are several ongoing 
studies within DOD investigating the optimal structure of the next generation of contracts. 
These include studies by OASD (HA), GAO, as well as independent contractors such as 
Kennell and Associates. These studies are, without exception, procurement sensitive and 
unavailable for review [Meyer, 1996]. Furthermore, they include only limited input from 
lead agents and ACOs with actual hands-on experience in administering the contracts. 
Therefore, this thesis focuses on problems encountered by administrative personnel by 
gathering inputs and suggestions from each region, consolidating these inputs and 
suggestions, and making recommendations for improving future TRICARE MCS 
contracts. 
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Data have been gathered primarily through telephone interviews and electronic 
mail surveys to key individuals in the lead agent offices ofRegions Ill, IV, VI, VIll, IX, 
X, and XI. Furthermore, working papers from OASD (HA) and experienced regions, as 
well as relevant literature have been reviewed for background information and evaluation 
purposes. 
D. SCOPE AND LIMITATIONS OF THE THESIS 
The focus of the analysis is to examine the unique provisions used in TRlCARE 
MCS contracts. Specifically, the objectives of the current provisions, how they 
are working to date, and how the next generation ofMCS contracts might be better 
constructed will be analyzed. 
The current TRlCARE MCS contracts have only been in place since September of 
1994; and health care delivery began in March of 1995. Thus, the only data analyzed are 
for the period 1995 to 1996. This small amount of data can, however, be used to draw 
germane conclusions. Details from ongoing studies will not be available for review until 
late 1997, and therefore cannot be utilized for this thesis. 
6 
II. THE TRICARE PROGRAM 
This chapter provides a brief history of military medicine, describing its path from 
the inception of the Civilian Health and Medical Program of the Uniformed Services 
(CHAMPUS) in 1956, to today's environment and the administration of the TRICARE 
MCS contracts. This chapter also gives an overview of the TRICARE system, including 
a description of its goals and mission, the lead agent's role, and the beneficiary's options 
within TRICARE. 
A. IDSTORY OF MJLITARY MEDICINE 
Medical care for families of active duty members of the Armed Forces can be 
traced to the inception of the Armed Forces themself "In 1884, Congress directed that 
'medical officers of the Army and contract surgeons shall whenever possible attend the 
families ofthe officers and soldiers free of charge' [GAO-HEHS 94-145, p.3]." The 
concept of providing families free care evolved over the next century through numerous 
conflicts. In September of 1966, Public Law 89-614 created the system currently known 
as CHAMPUS. CHAMPUS was designed to enhance the MTF's capability to provide 
medical care to active duty family members as well as retirees. 
Since 1966, CHAMPUS has supplemented the MTFs to comprise the MHSS. 
CHAMPUS has operated as a fee-for-service type insurance program (defined below). 
However, "this system lacked sufficient incentives and tools to control expenditures and 
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provide beneficiaries accessible care on an equitable basis [GAO-HEHS94-145, p. 3]." 
This statement, in itself, provides a basis for two of TRICARE's four goals. 
A ballooning Federal budget deficit and frequent CHAMPUS cost overruns 
throughout the early and mid 1980s, prompted the exploration of alternative methods of 
cutting health care costs, while still providing quality service [Braendel, pg 6-11]. This 
exploration led to several DOD demonstration projects, which were authorized by 
Congress [Braendel, pg 50]. These projects began in October 1987 with partnership 
agreements between DOD and civilian health care providers in several areas of the 
country. 
In 1988, the next reform project began in California and Hawaii. This was called 
the CHAMPUS reform initiative (CRI). It offered CHAMPUS beneficiaries a triple 
option benefit program which is still maintained in the TRICARE program. CRI's triple 
option program included: 
1. Standard CHAMPUS choice--a traditional indemnity insurance plan 
2. Preferred Provider Organization (PPO) choice 
3. Health Maintenance Organization (HMO) choice 
These options are explained more thoroughly in the "TRICARE Overview" section below. 
The PPO and HMO option made CRI the first program to introduce managed care 
aspects, frequently found in civilian health care plans, into the DOD health care system. 
Managed Care is defined as follows: 
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All activities performed by payer, insurer or health care provider 
organizations to assure delivery of appropriate and quality health care to 
beneficiaries. These activities include, but are not restricted to; quality 
assurance, utilization management, peer review, provider selection, patient 
cost sharing, capitation and other provider incentive plans. Organizations 
involved in managed care may use one, all or any combination of these 
activities to improve the quality and cost effectiveness of health care 
delivery. [Braendel, pg 18-19] 
Soon after the initiation of CRI, the Catchment Area Management (CAM) 
initiative was launched. CAM was "similar to CRI except that the focus is on the local 
catchment area, rather than across several states [Braendel, pg 51]." A catchment area is 
the area within a 40-mile radius of an MTF. Under CAM, provider networks are 
organized within a catchment area, by the MTF commander, rather than by the contractor. 
MTF commanders are given the responsibility for funds for direct care provided in his 
MTF, as well as for CHAMPUS funds to send beneficiaries to civilian physicians. 
Another CRI project was introduced in Washington and Oregon (now Region XI), 
in September 1992. With this second initiative, the lead agent concept was developed. 
The lead agent concept was designed to decentralize decision making in the execution of 
MCS contracts [Meyer, 1996]. This concept, as well as lead agent missions and roles, is 
further explained in the "TRICARE Overview" section below. 
After five years of demonstration projects, DOD announced the implementation of 
TRICARE on 22 September 1993. The first TRICARE MCS contract was awarded for 
Region XI on 8 September 1994, and health care delivery began in March 1995. The 
TRICARE program continues to include managed care features in the MCS contracts, 
using the lessons learned from the many demonstration projects [Meyer, 1996]. The 
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TRICARE contracts still use the triple option program from CRI, catchment area 
management from the CAM initiative, and lead agent concept developed in the second 
CRI. 
1. Trend Towards Managed Care 
Since the mid-1980s, military health care has trended away from fee-for-service 
toward managed care. This is primarily to cut costs. The civilian health care sector has 
seen a similar trend since the late 1970s. To understand the Military's trend more 
completely, it is important to understand how the current payment system is structured for 
military health care as compared with the previous system. Until the mid 1980s, if a 
military doctor referred a patient to the civilian community under CH.Mv1PUS, the cost of 
that referral would be borne by the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD). Therefore, 
the individual Service's medical community did not feel the economic impact of its referral 
decisions. This created a strong incentive to send patients to the civilian community, 
placing a severe financial burden on OSD. Large cost overruns became the norm, rather 
than the exception. OSD merely requested additional funds from Congress year after year 
[Braendel, p. 10]. In 1988, Congress responded by shifting this cost burden to the 
individual Service's medical community. MTF commanders and others -now clearly saw 
the economic hardships that civilian referrals created. This payment structure secured the 
movement toward the cost cutting of managed care systems and was a catalyst for the 
TRICARE program. 
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2. Fee-For-Service and Managed Care Trade-Offs 
Although there are many areas of concern to be addressed in the area of health 
care delivery, this thesis focuses on three: cost, quality, and access. Managed care has the 
benefit oflower costs, but there is sometimes a trade-off between lower cost and quality 
of service provided by a health care plan or beneficiary choice of/access to a health care 
provider. To understand these trade-offs, several terms need to be defined: 
Fee for Service- A system of reimbursement in which a medical provider 
charges a patient (or third-party payer) a specific price for a specific 
service. 
Indemnity insurance - A traditional health insurance plan in which the 
patient submits the medical bill to the insurance company for a specified 
level of reimbursement which may be equal to or less than the fee charged. 
Preferred Provider Organization (PPO)- Under this system, providers, 
usually organized by networks or panels, offer medical care for a set fee. 
Various benefits, such as lower co-insurance and better coverage, create 
incentives for patients to see "preferred" doctors. Restrictions on care 
givers are, by contrast, the disincentives. 
Health Maintenance Organizations (kll\10)- A prepaid medical care plan 
in which the organization receives a certain amount (usually monthly), and 
patients seek treatment from its affiliated medical staff The goal is to 
provide affordable health care through forms of MANAGED CARE--in 
which a PRIMARY-CARE provider is supposed to act as gatekeeper to 
specialists and expensive medical tests. Often subscribers pay a small 
amount at each visit. Patients in HMOs have variable limits on their choice 
of doctors. 
Cost Sharing - A provision of a health care plan that requires individuals to 
cover some part of their medical expenses. It may help to hold down costs 
by deterring individuals from seeking unnecessary care, or it may 
discourage necessary care. In universal insurance plans, cost sharing is a 
form of taxation on being sick and using services. Typical forms include 
deductibles, co-payment, and co-insurance. [Marmor, pg 255-269] 
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a. . Cost 
The annual rate of cost growth for health care typically decreases when 
moving from a fee-for-service environment, or indemnity type insurance plan, to an HMO 
type organization [Doyle, slide 23]. A preferred provider organization falls somewhere in 
the middle on the cost continuum of managed care [Kongstvedt, pg 3 5]. However, as 
cost decreases, freedom to choose between doctors also decreases [Doyle, slide 23]. To 
understand this it may be helpful to consider the incentives created by each of the systems. 
In a fee-for-service/indemnity environment, the patient will be reimbursed for most of the 
fee paid to the provider, so there is little monetary incentive for the patient to decrease 
doctor visits unless an insurance maximum is reached. Furthermore, the provider charges 
a fee for every service rendered. That fee may be set for a specific service and may be 
constrained by the competitive market, but the bottom line is that the more service the 
provider gives, the more money will flow into his/her pocket [Eastaugh, pg 106]. A 
simple example is a doctor that charges $25 for treating colds. It costs the doctor $15 in 
expenses to provide the service. If the doctor treats one patient he makes $10 profit, two 
patients $20, etc. Therefore, the incentive is to provide more service. Whether 
considering a company's, the military's, or the Federal Government's health care system, if 
the incentive is to provide more service, total health care costs will increase. Fee-for-
service systems have incentivized overprovision of inappropriate or unnecessary care. 
[Eastaugh, pg I 06] 
Conversely, in an HMO environment, the provider (the HMO) is given a 
fixed fee per enrolled member for a pre-determined period of time. The HMO receives 
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this fee whether services are rendered to enrollees or not. Thus, the incentive for the 
HMO is to provide less care and in the long run it provides an incentive to provide 
preventive care (e.g., promoting smoking cessation classes, AIDS awareness classes). 
However, less service could also result in lower quality service, and/or care that is 
inaccessible, so this must be closely monitored. [Eastaugh, pg 105-1 06] 
h. Quality 
As the trend towards managed care in health care, specifically military health care, 
escalates, so do concerns about the quality of care. Managed care systems could be 
tempted to put cost considerations abovethat ofquality of care [Marmor, pg 156]. 
Quality can have different definitions to different people. Therefore, it may be difficult to 
identifY the characteristics of quality care, much less differentiate between degrees of 
quality. 
When examining quality, the different systems' incentives again become a central 
issue. In a fee-for-service environment, a provider is incentivized to provide more care, 
perhaps more than might be necessary for a given situation [Eastaugh, pg 1 06]. 
Therefore, quantity vice quality of care, was the primary concern under such systems. 
As stated above, HMOs and managed care systems may have an incentive to 
provide less care [Eastaugh, pg 1 06]. Therefore, the question becomes: Does less care 
mean lower quality care? Some people contend that systems whose incentives are to 
provide less service, also have incentive to not perform all necessary clinical care [Nudd, 
pg. 43-44]. Furthermore, "the most common objection that physicians will actually voice 
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about managed care is that it reduces the quality of care [K.ongstvedt, pg 429]." 
However, some studies have discovered that HM:Os are adequately monitoring quality, 
and that no evidence of a difference in quality of care given by an HMO than that given in 
a traditional fee-for-service/indemnity system exists [Eastaugh, pg. 132]. Thus, DOD has 
attempted to devise a system that achieves strict cost objectives while maintaining quality 
service [Health Affairs-1996, pg 1-2]. 
c. Access 
The third critical component of health care is access to care, preferably easy 
access while controlling costs and maintaining quality. "For purchaser and members alike, 
access is an absolutely critical area [K.ongstvedt, pg 41 0]." Access is defined as "the 
timely use of personal health services to achieve the best possible outcomes [K.ongstvedt, 
pg 409]. For simplicity, this thesis lumps beneficiary choice of care providers as a 
subsidiary of access. Access is driven by the structure of the health care plan. 
In a fee-for-service environment, providers are reimbursed for each service that is 
performed. The fee-for-service option encourages giving more care, and virtually 
eliminates any risk to the care giver oflosing money. Therefore, more providers are 
willing to accept insurance on a fee-for-service basis. In this sense, care is more accessible 
in a fee-for-service environment. Another aspect of fee-for-service is choice. Typically 
indemnity insurance plans give beneficiaries free choice of which providers to use [Aaron, 
pg 188]. Therefore, as long as the provider accepts the insurance plan, then the 
beneficiary is free to be seen by the doctor of his choice. 
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Conversely, in an HMO, providers are given a set fee per enrollee per time period. 
If the provider spends more on that patient than the predetermined fee during a specific 
time period, it results in a direct loss of profit. This is a risk that some providers are not 
willing to take. To mitigate this risk, HM:Os limit beneficiaries as to their choice of 
providers, or charge an extra fee if the beneficiary uses a provider outside of the HMO. 
[Aaron, pg 8] 
PPOs provide the same payment structure for the providers as do the HMOs. 
Therefore, they provide the same incentives and risks for care givers to enter into the 
health care market. However, unlike HMOs, PPOs do not mitigate their risk by limiting 
the beneficiary•s choice of provider. PPOs allow that choice, but increase co-payments, or 
premiums, if the beneficiary chooses a provider that is different from the list of 
11preferred11 providers. 
B. CAPITATION: PRIVATE SECTOR VS. DOD 
Capitation is defined as 11 a payment mechanism in which health care providers are 
paid a fixed amount of money each month per enrolled member to cover services over a 
period of time. The provider agrees to this fixed, predetermined fee, regardless of how 
many times the member uses the service. The rate can be fixed for all members, or it can 
be adjusted for factors such as the age and sex of the members, based on actuarial 
projections of medical utilization. 11 [Halvorson, 1993] 
HMOs utilize the capitation budgeting concept. Based on the success ofHMOs, 
DOD is increasingly looking towards using a capitated budgeting system to contain health 
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care costs. Capitation budgeting is designed to provide health care providers financial 
incentives to contain costs [Nudd, Pg. 9]. However, because the provider is paid a 
predetermined fixed fee, regardless of how many times a patient utilizes his services, the 
provider shoulders all of the risk with regard to exceeding the capitated rate. 
Capitation provides different incentives in DOD than in the private sector. In the 
private sector profit is a driving force. To receive more profit in a capitated environment, 
private sector managed care organizations (HMOs) have an incentive to minimize costs by 
reducing demand for medical care. However, MTF commanders have little incentive to 
make profits. This is because "any funds remaining in the MTFs Annual Planning Figure 
(APF) are rolled back to the respective Service." [Chavez, pg. 54] 
Another reason that capitation provides different incentives in the private sector 
and DOD is the way that the per capita rate is determined. Market forces drive the 
capitated rate in the private sector. Therefore, HMOs must provide a per capita rate 
lower than that of its competitors in order to compete in the health care market. Any 
reduction in costs below the per capita rate results in increased profits for the HMO, but 
these profits do not affect its future capitated rates. [Chavez, pg 55] 
Conversely, capitated rates in DOD are determined by using historical cost data. 
Therefore, if an MTF provides care for costs under the capitated rate, it could affect the 
rate that it receives the following year. Therefore, improving efficiency and reducing 
costs could make the MTF's job more difficult in future years by lowering their capitated 
rate. [Chavez, pg. 55] 
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C. TRICARE OVERVIEW 
This section discusses the goals and missions of the TRICARE program. Then, it 
examines the methods implemented by the MHSS in the TRICARE program to achieve 
these goals. These methods include: contract type, lead agent's role, and beneficiary's 
triple option mechanism. Finally, this section describes some of the current problems that 
TRICARE is facing which must be considered in developing the next generation of 
contracts. 
1. Goals and Missions 
According to OSD (HA) the TRICARE Program is based on goals consistent 
with providing the three main aspects of health care: cost, quality, and access. The goals 
are [Health A:ffairs-1995, p.1]: 
1. Improving beneficiary access to care; 
2. Assuring the security of a high quality, consistent health care benefits for all 
MHSS beneficiaries, at low cost; 
3. Preserving choice for all non-active duty participants; and 
4. Containing overall DOD health care costs. 
There are several mechanisms, centered on achieving these goals, which guide the 
implementation of the TRICARE program. Three are discussed in this section, contract 
type, lead agent roles, and the triple option benefit program. 
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2. Contract Type 
There are several aspects of health care delivery that are difficult to quantify on a 
prospective basis. For example, due to the transient nature of military personnel and 
because of several rounds of the Base Realignment and Closure Commission, the 
beneficiary population within a region is difficult to predict. Therefore, health care 
providers who bid on any of the TRICARE MCS contracts incur a certain amount of risk. 
This risk increases when variables such as prices, beneficiary population (with a fluctuating 
military population due to frequent rotation, BRAC, and contingency operations) and 
health care services utilization are projected for a multi-year contract more than a year in 
advance of the start of health care services. Risk is also multiplied when the length of the 
contract spans over several years. TRICARE MCS contracts contain all of the above risk 
factors and, therefore, very difficult to prospectively price. [Region XI MCS contract, 
1994] 
Based on the goals of the TRICARE progr~ the MHSS states that it is necessary 
to contain the costs of military health care. It is difficult to contain costs when using a 
· cost-reimbursement type contract for health care delivery. Therefore, "it is the intent of 
the Government to 'fix' the price of[TRICARE] contract[s] for all cost elements where it 
is reasonably possible for an offeror to evaluate and estimate the costs and risks associated 
with the delivery of managed health care services to the MHSS [Region XI MCS contract, 
p. 150]." The Government also realizes the risks to the offeror and has implemented a 
new type of contract that is a fixed price "at risk" arrangement. The at risk feature allows 
the Government and the provider to share gains and losses through risk sharing corridors. 
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The percentage of gains or losses that each side bears depends on the level of gains or 
losses. At a predetennined level, the Government bears full responsibility for all losses. 
"This methodology utilizes a Bid Price Formula, which projects health care services prices 
based on preliminary data, and a Bid Price Adjustment Formula, which adjusts the 
projected price based on actual levels of CHAMPUS population, CHAMPUS 
reimbursement policy and MTF utilization [Region XI MCS contract, pg. 150]." The 
Government provides the preliminary estimates to the successful bidder based on data 
collected for a 12-month period immediately prior to the start of health care services, the 
Data Collection Period (DCP). This method is explained in detail in Chapter III. 
3. Lead Agent Roles 
As a result of the CRI in 1988 and 1993, the Government gained valuable 
experience in the execution ofMCS contracts. In 1993, DOD divided the nation into 12 
health care regions. Each region is led by the highest ranking commander of an MTF 
within that region, known as the Lead Agent. DOD has taken the position that since 
health care is delivered locally, it must be managed locally [Health Affairs-1995, pg. 2]. 
Therefore, lead agents take on an especially important role. 
Lead agents were developed to integrate issues and policies, which are sometimes 
conflicting between regions and services, and to establish the most effective method to 
deliver health care to a region [Lamar, pg 12]. Prior to 1994, there was no central control 
authority within each region who coordinated health care delivery, ensuring that MTFs 
operated in the most efficient and effective manner. Therefore, decisions were made at a 
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level where decision makers did not necessarily understand issues which were unique to a 
particular region. This led MTF commanders to make decisions that sub-optimized at the 
hospital level, and which may or may not have made sense from a regional perspective. 
Now that lead agents coordinate care and monitor performance for an entire region, sub-
optimizing at the hospital level can damage regional performance. Therefore, MTF 
commanders are incentivized to develop working relationships within their region to gain 
shared knowledge and enhance regional performance. [Engelhart, 1996] 
4. The Triple Option Program 
A major feature of the TRICARE Program, designed to achieve its overarching 
goals, is the triple option benefit. CHAMPUS eligible beneficiaries are offered three 
options: 1. Enroll in an HMO-type program referred to as TRICARE Prime (hereafter 
referred to as Prime); 2. Use a PPO called TRICARE Extra (hereafter referred to as 
Extra); or 3. Use civilian health care providers, on a fee-for-service, non-restricted basis, 
known as TRICARE Standard (hereafter referred to as Standard). Using the triple option 
program, TRICARE can achieve the cost benefits of managed care while maintaining the 
choice provided in fee-for-service programs for those who demand such access. 
Prime enrollees predominantly use "network" providers. However, they retain the 
freedom to utilize non-network providers for cost sharing (or co-insurance) payments that 
are substantially higher than Standard rates. A Prime beneficiary's co-insurance payments 
are somewhat lower than those who use the preferred provider network under Extra, 
making low cost the primary attraction of the Prime option, both from the beneficiary and 
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:MHSS perspective. Prime is the most aggressive option toward achieVing the goal of 
containing overall health costs. It is the least aggressive option toward achieving the goal 
of preserving beneficiary choice and access to care. 
Beneficiaries that use Extra, predominantly use physicians that are in a preferred 
provider network. The benefits of Extra are that it uses a network of providers which is 
larger than that used in the Prime option. Furthermore, Extra does not require enrollment 
by the beneficiary. Like TRICARE Prime, on a case-by-case basis, beneficiaries can use 
physicians that are not in the network, but they must then pay higher co-insurance rates 
than Standard. Because it is not totally "managed" care like Prime, TRICARE Extra is 
not as effective at containing cost. However, the Extra option provides beneficiaries with 
more choice for a smaller increase in co-insurance rates when network providers are not 
utilized. 
TRICARE Standard is identical to its predecessor, standard CHAMPUS. 
Standard is run as a traditional fee-for-service program. Co-insurance rates are 
substantially higher using this program than in the Prime or Extra options when network 
providers are utilized. Standard is the least aggressive program at containing cost and the 
most aggressive program at preserving beneficiary choice. 
D. CONCLUSION 
This chapter provided a brief history of military medicine, describing the "Road to 
TRICARE." This "Road" explained the different systems under which civilian health care 
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agencies and insurance companies operate, and the systems that DOD is utilizing to 
implement the TRICARE program. 
After two years of administering the TRICARE MCS contracts, the Government 
has developed many lessons learned. The MHSS and the TRICARE MCS contracts strive 
to maintain a balance between containing health care costs and preserving beneficiary (and 
overall) choice, while maintaining quality care. However, the different systems provide 
different incentives to both health care providers and beneficiaries. Furthermore, because 
of the budget system and other political influences, the military has added pressures that 
civilian organizations need not consider when implementing a health care system. This 
chapter explained some of the methods that DOD has used to mitigate these pressures in 
their TRICARE program. The contractual provisions which are unique to the TRICARE 
MCS contracts are examined in the next chapter. 
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ill. UNIQUE ASPECTS OF TRICARE MCS CONTRACT 
This chapter identifies and explains the contracting provisions and mechanisms that 
are unique to the TRICARE MCS contracts. Specifically, it addresses two areas: 
the Bid Price Adjustment (BP A) and resource sharing provisions. Although these 
provisions are addressed separately in the TRICARE contracts, their objectives are 
intertwined. For example, a change in the amount of resource sharing in which the MCS 
contractor engages will have an effect on the final bid price through the BP A. Most of 
the information contained in this chapter is the author's interpretation of Section G of the 
MCS contracts. Because there are slight differences in regional contracts, Region XI is 
used as the model for this analysis. 
A. BID PRICE ADJUSTMENT (BPA)- BACKGROUND INFORMATION 
The BP A is a contract mechanism that was created specifically for TRICARE 
MCS contracts [Smith, 1996]. The goal of the BPA is to ensure that the bid price for the 
MCS contracts is fair to both the Government and the MCS contractor [Smith, 1996]. 
The BP A is simple in concept, but complicated in operation. Its purpose is to adjust the 
proposed bid price for factors that are outside of the contractor's control [MDA906-94-C-
0003]. Initially, the Government provides the contractor with estimates of the number of 
eligible health care beneficiaries, the cost per eligible beneficiary, MTF utilization rates 
(i.e., how many beneficiaries will use MTFs vs civilian care for each type of service 
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offered), and the effect planned programs will have on costs (e.g., adding smoking 
cessation classes). These data are collected by the Government during the Data Collection 
Period (DCP), which consists of the 12-month period proceeding the start date of health 
care delivery. The contractor develops a bid price based on these estimates and eight 
trend factors, including: 
1. Per unit price inflation; 
2. Cost sharing (e.g., as patient's co-payment changes, how will this affect 
the bid price); 
3. Provider discounts (e.g., based on network developments, what 
discounts can be achieved); 
4. Claims management; 
5. Utilization ofCHAMPUS facilities· per eligible beneficiary (i.e. 
estimation of how many times each beneficiary will utilize civilian 
CHAMPUS facilities); 
6. Resource Sharing; 
7. Intensity (e.g., based on case mix or seriousness of illness, as explained 
in MTF Utilization subsection below); and 
8. Utilization Management. 
Currently, the practice is to adjust the bid price once a year, however, the RFP for the 
MCS contract for Regions I, II, and V applies quarterly BP As. The bid price is adjusted 
to account for changes between the DCP estimates and actual experience for the following 
variables: 
1. CHAMPUS eligible population; 
2. CHAMPUS costs during the DCP; 
3. MTF utilization rate measured by actual inpatient Non-availability 
Statements (NASs) issued and number of outpatient MTF visits; and 
4. Actual inflation rates and changes iQ:: CHAMPUS reimbursement policy 
(CPIRI). [Condra, 1996] 
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Thus, the contractor•s bid is a starting price which is adjusted up or down to 
account for changes that are beyond its control. Simply stated, the Government will pay 
the contractor more than its bid price if the region•s CHAMPUS eligible population is 
higher than predicted in the DCP. If the population is less than forecasted, the 
contractor•s bid price is lowered, and the contractor receives less money. By comparing 
actual experience to the data collected in the DCP, each factor is analyzed and adjusted 
using the same methodology utilized above for population. 
An adjustment may also be made to inpatient prices, based on case mix between 
MTFs and CHAMPUS facilities relative to the DCP. This is to prevent MTFs from 
changing their case mix and treating less serious illnesses in-house, while sending more 
serious illnesses to civilian providers. This would lower the MTF•s costs and raise the 
contractor•s costs, because it generally costs more money to treat more serious illnesses. 
However, if there was not a case mix adjustment, the contractor would not be 
compensated by the BP A because the number of patients treated by each may not have 
changed relative to the DCP. 
B. BID PRICE AND BPA FORMULAS 
A contractor derives the bid price he proposes for a TRICARE MCS contract 
from a very specific formula. The original price is based upon Government estimates and 
is adjusted annually, or quarterly, to account changes in actual experience from the prior 
base period•s (either the DCP or an adjusted option period) estimates. It is also adjusted 
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for changes in the inflation rates and CHAMPUS reimbursement policies (CPOO index). 
Finally, once the actual cost is calculated for each option period, the risk sharing corridors, 
are applied. 
The bid price formula is shown in the table below. 
C = 0 x E x [(Mp x P x Q) + (Me x R x S) + (M,. x T xU)]; where 
C = projected cost for each cost category 
0 = MTF utilization index 
E = number of CHAMPUS eligibles 
MP, Me, M5 = base period cost per eligible for Prime, Extra, and Standard, respectively 
P, R, T = proportion of eligibles for Prime, Extra, and Standard, respectively 
Q, S, U = total trend index for Prime, Extra, and Standard, respectively 
Bid Price Formula 
The cost, C, is calculated for Active Duty Dependents (ADD) and Non-Active 
Duty Dependents (NADD) based on seven care categories: 
1. Inpatient medical costs/surgical costs 
2. Inpatient obstetrics/gynecology costs 
3. Inpatient psychiatric costs 
4. Outpatient nonpsychiatric Emergency Room (ER) and office visit costs 
5. Outpatient psychiatric ER and office visit costs 
6. Outpatient radiological and laboratory costs 
7. Other outpatient costs (i.e. prescription drugs, ambulatory surgery, and 
other outpatient procedures 
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The bid price is adjusted for each of the seven health care categories using the following 
formula: 
AC = BC x (O)Op) x (EjEp) x (C)Cp); where 
AC = adjusted cost for the option period being adjusted 
BC = cost in the base period 
0 3 , OP = "0" factor (MTF utilization), actual and projected 
Ea, EP = eligible population, actual and projected 
Ca, CP = CPIRI index, actual and projected 
Bid Price Adjustment Formula 
The following subsections will describe the various portions of the BP A formula and 
outline the process by which adjustments are calculated. 
1. MTF Utilization Index 
The MTF utilization index, 0, is commonly referred to as the "0" factor 
throughout the medical community. There are two basic assumptions made which create 
the need for the "0" factor adjustment. These assumptions are that the contractor's costs 
will increase if: 1) there is a decrease in the number of outpatient visits to MTFs within a 
region, or 2) there is an increase in the number ofNASs issued for inpatient visits. 
However, ifMTF utilization decreases, utilization of the contractor's facilities will not 
necessarily increase on a one for one basis because all persons who are unable to obtain 
care from a MTF do not always see a civilian care provider. This may be because of cost 
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sharing requirements for CHAMPUS or they may have other insurance· options than 
CHAMPUS [Montgomery, pg. 4-6]. The "0" factor is broken down into inpatient and 
outpatient categories and measured by changes in the number ofNASs issued per eligible 
beneficiary for the inpatient category and the number of outpatient visits for the outpatient 
category. Moreover, the "0" factor is calculated separately for ADDs and NADDs. 
a. Inpatient Utilization Factor 
The inpatient "0" factor is calculated based on the change in NASs issued 
per eligible beneficiary during an option period as compared to the base period. The 
inpatient "0" factor is computed using the following formula: 
0 = [(NjNb) xN%] +nooN%; where 
N0 =number ofNASs per eligible issued in the option period 
Nb =number ofNASs per eligible issued in the base period 
N%= Proportion of CHAMPUS costs requiring an NAS 
nonN% =Proportion of CHAMPUS costs not requiring an NAS 
Inpatient MTF Utilization Factor Adjustment Formula 
If the number ofNASs issued increases, the "0" factor will be greater than one and 
the bid price will be adjusted upward. Conversely, if the number ofNASs decrease, the 
"0" factor will be less than one and the bid price will decrease. The increase or decrease 
in price is based on average cost per NAS issued during the DCP and applied to the 
change in the number ofNASs issued during the period being adjusted. For example, 
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when the bid price is applied, each NAS issued for ambulatory surgery costs the 
Government approximately $4,300. This is based on historical cost data collected in the 
DCP. The ultimate adjusted bid price will be changed, according to the formula set out 
above, based on the number ofNASs issued, not NASs used. A cancelled NAS is tallied 
in the monthly NAS count unless another one is reissued during the same month in which 
the original NAS was issued. If a cancelled NAS is not reissued in the same month, a 
reissue in the following month will also be included in the total NAS count. 
A case mix adjustment may be applied to the inpatient "0" factor so that MTFs 
cannot "game the system" and send more serious inpatient cases to CHAMPUS providers, 
thus reducing MTF costs while maintaining consistent numbers of issued NASs. Several 
categories of care are assigned Relative Weighted Products (RWPs). The case mix 
adjustment applies indices which are calculated based upon the average number ofRWPs 
per admission to CHAMPUS as compared to RWPs per admission to MTFs. One 
important point to realize is that the case mix adjustment is only applied if the case mix 
indices for CHAMPUS and the MTFs move in opposite directions and the magnitude of 
change for both case mix indices is at least two percent, relative to the DCP. 
b. Outpatient Utilization Factor 
The outpatient "0" factor relies upon the change in the number of 
CHAMPUS outpatient visits (OPVs) per eligible CHAMPUS beneficiary based upon the 
following formula: 
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Cb = CHAMPUS OPV s per eligible in the base period 
Mb = MTF OPV s per eligible in the base period 
M 0 = MTF OPV s per eligible in the option period being adjusted 
VTF = Volume Tradeoff factor 
Outpatient MTF Utilization Factor Adjustment 
The bottom line is that if the number ofMTF OPVs decrease, the "0" factor will be 
greater than one and the contract price will increase as a result of the BP A and vice versa. 
All of the above factors are easily measured, except the VTF. 
The VTF is calculated to reflect the fact that changes in MTF outpatient visits by 
non-active duty beneficiaries do not produce equal and opposite changes in CHAMPUS 
utilization. Through analysis the Government has determined that for every 1. 8 fewer 
MTF OPVs there is one additional CHAMPUS OPV among all ADDs. ForNADDs the 
ratio is 2.2: 1. The contractor is free to use the Government's estimates for VTFs or 
calculate its own for each contract option period, averaged across each of the seven health 
care categories. [Montgomery, pg 5-8] 
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c. MTF Utilization Information Data Flow 
MTF utilization data are collected by all MTFs within a region. Each MTF 
enters these utilization data into a service-specific, central data base. There are currently 
three central data bases used in the collection of utilization data. OASD (HA) utilizes an 
actuarial support contractor, Kennell and Associates, to collect and manipulate utilization 
data, and forecast trends for future contract option periods [Condra, 1996]. Once 
Kennell and Associates completes this task, data are passed to OASD (HA), which in turn 
sends the data to regional lead agents for validation. The information is validated and 
returned to OASD (HA), which compiles this, and other adjustment factor information, to 
make annual adjustments to the bid price. After all adjustment factor information is 
collected and compiled, OASD (HA) sends the adjustment calculations to the PCO at the 
TRICARE Support Office (TSO). Finally, the PCO issues a modification to the MCS 
contractor, which changes the contracts original bid price [Norris, 1996]. 
2. CHAMPUS Eligibility Factor 
The second factor in the bid price formula, and subsequently the BP A, considers 
the number of CHAMPUS eligible beneficiaries within each region for which the 
contractor will be "at risk" to provide care. CHAMPUS eligibles are broken down into 
two categories: ADDs and NADDs. Within these categories, the Government provides 
the contractor with estimates of the number ofCHAMPUS eligibles broken down into 
"eligible months" for the contractor to formulate its bid price. These data are collected 
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throughout the DCP and do not include Prime beneficiaries with an MTF as their Primary 
Care Manager (PCM), PCMs being the manager who authorizes medical services for an 
individual. PCMs are often referred to as "gatekeepers" in a civilian health care network. 
Changes in eligible months are what the BP A utilizes to determine the dollar value change 
to the contract for the CHAMPUS eligibility factor. 
The data to be used for the CHAMPUS eligible beneficiary adjustment will be 
determined by the actual average number of eligibles as listed in the quarterly Defense 
Enrollment Eligibility Reporting System (DEERS) report. The DEERS database is 
updated continually as patients are admitted to MTFs [Vector Research, Inc., pg 2-2]. The 
actual average number of eligibles is multiplied by 12 to compute eligible months for 
the BP A. The number of eligibles for each region is used by Kennel and Associates, and 
passed to OASD (HA) to make annual BPAs [Norris, 1996]. Bid prices are adjusted 
retrospectively based on changes from the base period to the option period being adjusted. 
3. CHAMPUS Price Inflation Reimbursement Index (CPIRI) 
Price inflation and changes in CHAMPUS reimbursement policies can dramatically 
effect the unit price for health care in each of the seven care categories. These changes 
can substantially increase the risk placed on the contractors and/or the Government in a 
fixed price arena. It is especially difficult to predict these changes when each TRICARE 
MCS contract spans a period of five years. The CPIRI adjustment was designed to 
mitigate this risk. 
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The CPIRI is based on 12 components (or update factors). Each of these 
components is assigned a weight that is fixed throughout the contract. The sum of all the 
weights total 1 00 percent. The indices are measured from the midpoint of the DCP to the 
midpoint of the option period being adjusted. Therefore, each index is set at 1.0 at the 
midpoint of the DCP. If there is a projected 2.7 percent increase in the cost of medical 
care due to inflation and changes in CHAMPUS reimbursement policies between the 
midpoint of the DCP to the midpoint of the first option period, the projected CPIRI for 
option period one will be set at 1.027. At the end of option period one, the Government 
will compare the actual values of the CPIRI against the projected values. If the 
percentage value of the difference between actual and projected values of the CPIRI falls 
outside of a preset range, the contractor's bid for health care costs will be adjusted by the 
entire difference. For example, in the REP for regions VII and VIII, the percentage 
difference in actual and projected CPIRI had to exceed two percent for option period one, 
three percent in option periods two and three, and four percent in option periods four and 
five, for the CPIRI adjustment to be made to health care costs. 
4. ' Ri~k Sharing 
Finally, after the actual cost of health care is calculated through the bid price 
adjustment formula, contract risk sharing is applied. TRICARE MCS contracts are fixed-
price "at risk" contracts. This means that the Government and the contractor share the 
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risk in both overruns and underruns of the contracts as losses and gains are placed into 
risk sharing corridors as described below. 
The contractor's bid price for TRICARE MCS contracts is the sum of four 
components: administrative costs, administrative profit, health care costs and health care 
profit. Administrative costs, administrative profit, and health care profit are fixed with the 
contractor's best and final offer (BAFO). However, due to the difficulty in projecting 
health care costs, they may be adjusted periodically by the BP A as explained above in 
Section B. The following subsections will explain how losses and gains are placed in 
corridors and apportioned between the Government and the contractor. 
5. Loss Sharing Corridor 
The mechanics of a fixed-price, at-risk contract are similar to those found in a 
fixed-price incentive-firm (FPIF) contract. However, in an incentive-firm contract, the 
point of total assumption (PTA) is the point where the contractor bears the burden, dollar 
for dollar, of all further cost overruns. In an at-risk arrangement, the point of total 
Government responsibility (POTGR) is the point where the responsibility for further cost 
overruns rests solely on the Government. This point occurs when the contractor has 
absorbed losses equal to or greater than the cumulative profits he gained·from previously 
completed option periods plus a predetermined amount of equity which the contractor has 
put at risk. Shared gains realized from previous option periods are included in this figure. 
The amount of equity held at risk is unique to each MCS contract. 
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The loss sharing corridor in the MCS contracts has three tiers. The loss corridor, 
and first tier, begins when actual health services costs exceed the adjusted proposed health 
care services price (APHCSP). The APHCSP is calculated by the BP A formula described 
in SectionB above. Until the actual costs reach 101 percent ofthe APHCSP, the 
contractor is responsible for all accumulated losses. When actual costs are between 101 
percent and the POTGR, the Government bears responsibility for 80 percent of the losses 
incurred. Lastly, when actual costs are greater than the POTGR, the Government bears 
responsibility for 100 percent of further losses. 
6. Gain Sharing Corridor 
Underruns, or gains, are shared in a similar fashion as losses. The gain sharing 
corridor is also tiered. It starts with the adjusted proposed health care services cost 
(APHCSC). It should be noted that the APHCSC includes only the health care services 
cost component and not any of the three fixed cost components. Gains between zero and 
20 percent of the APHCSC fall into the first tier of the gain sharing corridor. Eighty 
percent of the first tier gains are retained by the Government and 20 percent are retained 
by the contractor. The Government retains 90 percent of the gains greater than 20 percent 
of the APHCSC while the contractor retains only ten percent of these gains. It is 
important to note that any gains realized by the contractor are at risk for recovery by the 
Government if :future option periods fall past the POTGR in a loss sharing corridor. Gains 
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can also be used to pay the Government for past losses in option periods where the 
POTGR was exceeded. 
The figures below illustrate the basic structure of risk sharing corridors [Contract 
:MDA906-94-C-0003, pg. 165]: 




Gain Sharing Corridor 
1 
2 
Actual Cost vs. APHCSP 
1 00 to :::; 101% 
>101% to POTGR 
>POTGR 
Govt I Contractor Share 
---1 
0% I 100% 
80%120% 
100%10% 
Figure 1: Loss Sharing Corridor 
Actual Cost vs. APHCSC Govt I Contractor Share 
2:,80% to <1 00% 80%/20% 
<80% 90%/10% 
Figure 2: Gain Sharing Corridor 
C. RESOURCE SHARING 
Resource sharing is another contracting mechanism that is unique to the 
TRICARE MCS contracts. It is a mechanism that seeks to optimize the use of available 
medical resources within a region. "In the context of resource sharing, this translates into 
determining the types and amounts of resources which should be shared between a 
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Military treatment facility (MTF) and a managed care support contractor in order to 
ensure the lowest overall health care costs for the [G]overnment [Montgomery, pg 1]." 
Although this sharing of resources seeks to lower the overall cost to the Government, it is 
the Government's intention to have the contractor share in these savings through resource 
sharing agreements (RSAs). Under the TRICARE contracts, RSAs can be internal or 
external agreements. 
1. Internal Resource Sharing 
Under internal resource sharing agreements, civilian physicians provide care in an 
MTF. In this scenario, the MCS contractor avoids paying the institutional costs under 
CHAMPUS, but still incurs costs for professional services. The savings incurred by the 
avoidance of institutional costs should be shared between the government (e.g., the MTF) 
and the MCS contractor. 
Savings from internal resource sharing can be realized by the Government in one 
of three ways: 
1. Resource sharing savings investments can be included in the contractor's 
BAFO. In this case, his BAFO would include a cost per eligible trend 
factor for resource sharing savings. For example, if a contractor's physician 
uses the MTF, the contractor avoids the cost of claims processing. This 
lowers the initial bid price. 
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2. If partial workload credit is negotiated in the RSA, the Government will 
realize savings through the BPA when calculating the "0" factor. Note 
that if partial workload credit is not negotiated in the RSA, the 
Government will not achieve these savings because the 
contractor will receive NAS equivalent credit for his resource 
sharing effort and the MTF will not get credit for the increased MTF 
workload. 
3. The Government will also realize any residual savings obtained by the 
contractor through the application of the BPA. The Government's 
share of the savings depends on which risk sharing corridor applies. 
[Vector Research, Inc., pg 4] 
2. External Resource Sharing 
MTF physicians provide care in the contractor's medical facility under external 
resource sharing agreements. In this way the MCS contractor still pays the institutional 
costs under CHAMPUS, but avoids paying the cost for professional services [Vector 
Research Inc., pg 19]. This cost avoidance also results in savings that should be shared 
between the Government and the MCS contractor. 
Savings from external resource sharing can be realized by the Government in the 
same ways as internal resource sharing, except the Government does not realize savings 
from the contractor's BAFO. BAFOs do not contain external resource sharing because 
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they are separately negotiated arrangements between the MTF and the contractor. [Vector 
Research Inc., attachment 1] Therefore, savings can only be realized through the "0" 
factor adjustment, and through risk sharing adjustments. 
D. RESOURCE SHARING, BID PRICE,_ AND BFAINTERACTIONS 
Resource sharing can effect the bid price in a maximum of three ways: through the 
BAFO, "0" factor, and risk sharing. The first way, through the BAFO, uses resource 
sharing to change the contractor's original bid price. This is accomplished by using a 
resource sharing trend factor. This factor is usually less than one and reflects the 
contractor's best estimates as to the impact of resource sharing on CHAMPUS costs 
[Vector Research Inc., pg 5]. For example, if a contractor feels he could achieve 10 
percent savings through resource sharing, he would apply a trend factor of .90. This 
factor is develop by using a savings-to-cost ratio. For example, if a contractor estimates 
an average savings-to-cost ratio of2.50 and plans to spend $20,000 in resource sharing 
expenditures, this amount translates to a gross cost avoidance of$50,000 ($20,000 x 2.5 
= $50,000) and a net contract reduction of$30,000 ($50,000- $20,000) [Vector Research 
Inc., pg 6]. The $30,000 net savings are reflected in the development of the trend factor 
and a lower initial bid price. 
The second way for resource sharing to effect the bid price is through the "0" 
factor in the BP A formula. When internal resource sharing occurs, MTF utilization 
increases, either through a decreased number ofNASs per eligible for inpatient care or an 
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increased number ofMTF outpatient visits. Either way, this would result in a lower bid 
price when the "0" factor is applied during the BPA process. When calculating this effect, 
the Government must be careful to ensure that the savings have not already been 
accounted for in a lower initial bid price. This would, in effect, double the savings that the 
Government should appropriately receive [Engelhart, 1996]. Therefore, it is appropriate 
to include the impact of resource sharing in the "0" factor adjustment only after the 
contractor has reached the level of spending he applied when calculating the trend factor 
($20,000 for the example above). [Vector Research Inc., pg 9] 
Internal resource sharing utilizes the expertise of civilian physicians in a MTF. The 
service that the civilian physician provides is a service that would, without resource 
sharing, result in the issuance of a NAS. This is because the MTF would not normally 
have the capability to perform that service and it would be necessary to issue a NAS to 
refer a patient to a civilian provider. To account for the decreased number ofNASs issued 
as a result of internal resource sharing, NAS equivalents are issued when a CHAMPUS 
physician provides inpatient care in an MTF. Also, internal resource sharing increases the 
number of outpatient visits to an MTF that would normally be performed in a civilian 
facility. This number of extra visits is subtracted from the MTF's outpatient visit count 
before the "0" factor adjustment is calculated [Vector Research Inc., Pg 9]. Both of these 
adjustments cease when the full effect of the resource sharing trend factor has been 
achieved. 
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The final way in which resource sharing may effect the bid price is through risk 
sharing. This puts both the Government and the contractor partially at risk for the success 
or failure of a resource sharing agreement. If the agreement is a success and the 
contractor avoids more costs through resource sharing than projected in his original bid 
price, then the Government will receive 80 or 90 percent of that excess cost avoidance, 
depending on which gain sharing corridor is applicable. Conversely, if the contractor is 
unable to achieve the savings projected in his original bid price, then the Government may 
share in those losses. The government could be responsible for 0, 80 or 100 percent of 
the losses depending on the applicable loss sharing corridor (Refer to Figure 1 on page 36 
of this Chapter). 
E. CONCLUSION 
This chapter identifies and explains the unique aspects of the TRICARE MCS 
contracts including: contract type, risk sharing, BP A, and resource sharing. These 
aspects are separate, yet intertwined. As with many complicated systems, problems often 
surface. Some question why the system is so complicated, and others feel it does not 
address enough issues. Chapter IV discusses some of the issues and problems that 
Government personnel face when administering the TRICARE MCS contracts. It also 




IV. DATA PRESENTATION AND ANALYSIS 
This chapter discusses and analyzes data collected through a series of interviews 
and survey responses of lead agent representatives from each TRICARE region and 
representatives from three other MTFs. These individuals were selected because of their 
experience and their attendance at the TRICARE Financial Management Executive 
E;ducation Program (TFMEEP) seminar, held in Monterey, California from 13-17 October 
1996. Data were collected a variety of ways. First, extensive phone interviews were 
conducted with working level individuals from several regional lead agent offices, other 
large MTFs, and OASD (HA). Distinguishable, recurring categories of concern surfaced 
through these interviews. These concerns helped develop a survey, which was distributed 
to the attendees of the TFMEEP seminar. The survey was also sent to several contracting 
officer's technical representatives (COTRs) to get a perspective from the MTF level. The 
intent ofthe survey was to obtain a working level viewpoint of the problems associated 
with the BPA process and resource sharing aspects ofthe MCS contracts. These ideas 
were then consolidated to make meaningful recommendations for the structure of future 
TRICARE MCS contracts. 
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A. PHONE INTERVIEWS 
During phone interviews, four areas of concern were consistently raised 
concerning the BP A process and resource sharing. They are: 
1. The complexity of the BP A process; 
2. The methods by which the Government holds a contractor "at risk" for 
the costs associated with health care delivery (e.g., fairness in the risk 
sharing structure, in patient distribution); 
3. The inability of the BP A process to account for structural changes 
within DOD (e.g., downsizing, Base Realignment and Closure Commission 
[BRAC]); and 
4. The inefficiency of resource sharing and resource support agreements. 
B. SURVEY QUESTIONNAIRE 
Based upon the conceiTlS-voiced in telephone interviews, as well as 
recommendations from consulting agencies (Kennell and Associates and Vector Research 
Corporation), the following survey questions were developed: 
1. a. What problems have you encountered (or do you expect to 
encounter) in administering the BPA mechanism? 
b. Are any of these contractual problems? 
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2. a. What problems have you encountered (or do you expect to 
encounter) in administering Resource Sharing Agreements? 
b. Are any of these contractual problems? 
3. a. How do you hold a contractor 11at risk .. for health care costs when 
MTFs control the level of care provided to CHAMPUS eligibles? 
b. If you feel the contractor is not at risk, how does the Government 
provide the contractor incentives to hold down costs? 
c. Does the Bid Price Adjustment accomplish the above? 
4. a. Assuming the goal of the BP A is to make fair and equitable 
adjustments to the contracts, how could the Government make the 
BP A simpler yet capture the circumstances needed to keep the 
contractor from charging a premium for risk? 
b. Does the BP A, as currently written, capture enough of these 
circumstances, or does it capture too many? Why? 
5. Is the risk sharing structure set up in the BP A manuals fair and 
equitable? Why or why not? 
6. a. What contractual changes can be made to facilitate administration 
of the BP A process? 
b. What type of provisions can be added to or deleted from the 
contract to achieve a fair and equitable price and minimize the risk 
premium that the Government ultimately pays? 
A total of 22 surveys were sent via electronic mail, of which five were returned. 
Eleven more surveys were conducted through telephone interviews. The survey was sent 
to one or more lead agent representatives from every TRICARE Region, three contracting 
officer's technical representatives (COTRs), one individual from the Center for Health care 
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Education and Studies, and three people from major MTFs that are not designated as lead 
agents, but who attended the TFMEEP conference. 
Additionally, the survey targeted GS-13, or higher, Government employees and 
0-3, or higher, military grade officers to ensure that experienced personnel, in both 
acquisition and health care delivery, were represented. Furthermore, respondents were 
informed that the survey was attempting to gather information to make recommendations 
to change future TRICARE MCS contracts. 
1. Survey Questions l.a. and l.b 
I. a. What problems have you encountered (or do you expect to encounter) 
in administering the bid price adjustment? 
l.b. Are any of these problems contractual? 
(a) Discussion. 
Question 1.a was asked to ascertain what problems with the BP A working 
level individuals felt most effected contract administration. All 16 of the surveys received 
had answers to this question and three common responses were received. First, a majority 
of the respondents felt that there was inadequate information flow between Government 
entities for the BP A process to function smoothly. Second, the BP A process is too 
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complex. Lastly, the MTFs do not have adequate incentives to cooperate with the MCS 
contractors because the savings from a reduction in the contract bid price do not flow to 
the MTF level. It should be noted that, although several problems were mentioned, most 
of the respondents expressed that the BP A is working as the Government intended, but 
that the BP A process could be improved. 
All seven responses received for question Lb. were unanimous--the complexity of 
the BP A process is a contractual problem. All seven responded that the 
number of factors in the contract should be reduced, or the TRICARE contracts should be 
fully capitated. 
(b) Analysis of Response Data. 
From the 16 surveys received, 50 percent of the respondents felt that the 
biggest problem with the BP A process was that the information flow between Government 
agencies, including OASD (HA), the procuring contracting officer (PCO), the ACOs, lead 
agent staffs, and MTFs was inadequate. The information includes adjustment factor 
numbers used by the PCO, in conjunction with OASD (HA), to make adjustment to the 
bid price. Region XI, felt that because its region was the first to implement a TRICARE 
contract, the information flow process had not been established at the time, but felt that 
the problem had been subsequently corrected for other TRICARE regions. Yet, seven 
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other regions expressed that there is still a problem with receiving timely information to 
prevent or correct problems. 
The second most common response to question I.a. was that the BP A process was 
too complex. Specifically, respondents felt there are too many factors involved in making 
the adjustments. Several suggestions were made to remedy this problem. Four (50 
percent) of the eight surveys that stated complexity was a problem, suggested reducing the 
adjustment factors to only those that involve force movement. Force movement includes 
items such as rapid, mass deployment of forces and base closure resulting from BRAC. 
Three (38 percent) others suggested that full capitation (as explained in Chapter II) of the 
contracts was the only way to solve the complexity issue. It is important to note that in 
follow-up interviews, most of the respondents who stated that the BP A process was too 
complicated, prefaced their responses by stating that the BP A process was working as the 
Government intended and that it accomplished the goal of making fair and equitable 
adjustments to the bid price. Their suggestions would only simplify the process. 
Four (25 percent) of the respondents stated that the MTFs do not have adequate 
incentives to cooperate with the MCS contractors because the savings from a reduction in 
the contract bid price do not flow back to the MTF level. Furthermore, MTFs feel that 
losses incurred from an increased bid price are not distributed fairly among the MTFs or 
along Service lines. 
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2. Survey Questions 2.a. and 2.b. 
2.a. What problems have you encountered (or do you expect to encounter) 
in administering Resource Sharing Agreements? 
2. b. Are any of these problems contractual? 
(a) Discussion. 
Question 2.a. was asked to ascertain what problems with resource sharing 
working level individuals felt most affected contract administration. A majority of the 
regions surveyed felt that the resource sharing aspect of the TRICARE contracts was 
working well. Only five (31 percent) of the 16 surveys suggested any problems related to 
the resource sharing aspect of the contracts. However, three problems were mentioned on 
more then one survey and merit discussion. 
No response specifically targeted any problems as contractual. However, several 
stated that the complexity of the BP A process and the BP A's relationship to resource 
sharing made resource sharing inherently difficult to analyze and understand. 
(b) Analysis of Response Data. 
Five (31 percent) out of the 16 individuals surveyed responded to questions 
I.a. and 1. b.. The two most common problems discussed relate directly to the BP A. 
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They are: 1.) MTFs have very little success in understanding how resource sharing 
agreements will affect the BPA; and 2.) MTFs do not have adequate incentives to 
cooperate with the MCS contractors because the savings realized from resource sharing 
agreements do not flow back to the MTF level. The third problem, mentioned on only 
two surveys, suggested that the Government does a less than adequate job at financial 
analysis and, therefore, can not properly analyze resource sharing opportunities. 
Of the five surveys with a response to this question, 100 percent strongly 
believed that the MTF s have very little success in understanding how resource sharing 
agreements affect the BP A process. Three ( 60 percent) of the five that answered this 
question felt that this was due to the complexity of the BP A process not to the MTFs' 
capability. However, two respondents felt that the MTFs, in general, do lack the 
capability to conduct thorough financial analysis and, therefore, can not properly analyze 
resource sharing opportunities. These two respondents stated further that this lack of 
capability is why MTFs can not relate resource sharing to the BP A process. 
The same four individuals who stated that incentives were a problem in 
question 1.a., reiterated this statement in question 2.a. All four felt that resource sharing 
saved the Government money, but that MTFs do not get enough credit in this process. 
Additionally, all four felt that 100 percent of the saving accrued from resource sharing 
agreements should be distributed between the MTFs, based upon each facility's 
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contribution to savings. This would still save the Government money on an overall basis, 
and it would incentivize MTFs to participate fully in the process. 
3. Survey Questions 3.a., 3.b., and 3.c. 
3.a. How do you hold a contractor "at risk" for health care costs when 
MTFs control the level of care provided to CHAMP US eligibles? 
3. b. If you feel the contractor is not at risk, how does the Government 
provide the contractor incentives to hold down costs? 
3 .c. Does the Bid Price Adjustment accomplish the above? 
(a) Discussion. 
Question 3.a. was asked because, during telephone interviews, several 
individuals raised concerns about how the Government holds the contractor at risk for 
health care costs. Specifically, there were increased concerns when MTFs control the 
level of care that they provide to CHAMPUS eligibles. 
The purpose of question 3.b. was to obtain suggestions on how to hold the 
contractor at risk for health care costs effectively so that the Government is not held 
accountable for wasteful or unnecessary contractor spending. Most of the telephone 
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interviews revealed that Government personnel feel that the contractor is not at risk and 
should be more accountable for health care costs. 
Question 3. c. was asked to obtain a sense of how well the BP A process is 
working as far as holding the contractor at risk for health care costs. A total of seven 
people responded to this question: two negative, five positive. 
(b) Analysis of Response Data. 
Most of the respondents answered questions 3.a. and 3.b. together. A total 
of II responses was received to these questions. The majority (64 percent) of these 
responses felt that the contractors were not at risk in the current contracts, and that the 
Government should move more toward capitation. Some respondents mitigated this 
statement with a suggestion that the Government should separate the contracts and 
capitate most aspects but leave an option to adjust the bid price for Force movements. 
When analyzing the seven answers received to question 3.c., the data seemed to 
contradict the statements received for questions 3.a. and 3.b .. Five respondents answered 
that the BPA did accomplish the task of holding the contractor at risk. Only two (29 
percent) said it did not. However, four went on to say that it only partially accomplished 
the task, and that the contracts should move towards full capitation. 
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4. Survey Questions 4.a. and 4.b. 
4.a. Assuming the goal of the BPA is to make fair and equitable 
adjustments to the contracts, how does the Government make the BP A simpler yet 
capture the circumstances needed to keep the contractor from charging a premium for 
risk? 
4.b. Does the BPA Process, as currently written, capture enough of these 
circumstances, or does it capture too many? Why? 
(a) Discussion. 
Both question 4.a. and 4.b. were asked so that the author could address 
subsidiary research question Number 5 from Chapter I. This question was developed with 
the assistance of Mr. Bart Smith of Kennell and Associates, a Government support 
contractor that helped OASD (HA) construct the bid price and BP A formulas in the 
current TRICARE contracts. From his experience, Mr. Smith stated that Government 
personnel want "the best of all worlds" [Smith, 1996]. They want simple contracts, 
where the contractor retains most, if not all, of the risk at the lowest possible price. 
Consequently, this question was developed to get a working level perspective on how the 
Government can attain the "best of all worlds" from the TRICARE MCS contracts. Two 
common answers to question 4.a. were found in the 15 responses. No answers were 
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received for question 4.b., necessitating follow-up interviews, which obtained this 
information. 
(b) Analysis of response data. 
The most frequent response received for question 4. a. was to move 
towards capitation. Ten of the 15 responses (67 percent) included capitation. However, 
of these ten responses, five did not feel full capitation was the correct way to hold down 
the risk premium that the Government would pay under such a system. Three of these five 
felt that the TRICARE contracts should be separated by primary care manager (PCM), 
and capitated accordingly. The contractor would be capitated for the population for 
which he was the PCM, and the Government would be capitated for the population for 
which it was the PCM. Two of the five respondents felt full capitation was not correct, 
stating that there needs to be a provision to adjust the contractor's bid price for force 
movements, but the adjustments could be made much simpler than the current BP A 
process. 
The five other responses to question 4. a. stated that the BP A process could 
work correctly, as currently written, if there were an adequate data system to track 
information. Furthermore, this data system must be able to pass information between 
Government entities and the contractor. 
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When asked question 4.b., ten of 16 respondents felt that the BPA, as 
currently written, contained more than enough circumstances and made the process 
complex. Several respondents went on to state that the complexity of the current system 
probably cost the Government and the contractor. more in administrative costs than 
capitation would add in risk premium. 
5. Survey Question 5. 
5. Is the risk sharing structure set up in the BP A manuals fair and 
equitable? Why or Why not? 
(a) Discussion. 
This question intended to discover if the risk sharing corridors in the 
contracts favored the contractor or the Government. The author felt that suggestions 
might flow easily from the data if the risk sharing structure showed obvious bias toward 
either the contractor or the Government. Twelve out of the 16 surveys received 
responded to this question. 
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(b) Analysis of response data. 
Of the 12 responses received, five stated that the risk sharing structure was 
fair, and seven stated that it was biased either toward the Government or the contractor. 
Of the seven that said it was unfair, four felt it favored the contractor, and three felt it 
favored the Government. Furthermore, on the written surveys received, there was little, 
or no, explanation of why the respondents felt that the risk sharing structure was biased. 
The author feels that these data are inconclusive, so follow-up interviews 
were conducted to aquire more information. During these interviews, it became clear that 
most (73 percent) of those who responded, felt that loss sharing corridors favored the 
contractor, and gain sharing corridors favored the Government. These respondents felt 
that the contractor should bear a greater burden of the losses, as well as keep a greater 
percentage of the gains as profit. They felt this would create more of an incentive for the 
contractor to hold down costs. Three individuals (27 percent) who responded, again 
stated that the risk sharing structure was fair and should not be changed. 
6. Survey Questions 6.a. and 6.b. 
6. a. What contractual changes can be made to facilitate administration of 
the BPA Process? 
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6. b. What type of provisions can be added to, or deleted from, the 
contract to achieve a fair and equitable price and minimize the risk premium that the 
Government ultimately pays? 
(a) Discussion. 
These questions were asked so that the author could obtain a different 
perspective on subsidiary research question Number 5 from Chapter I. Questions 6.a. and 
6.b. attempted to gather specific recommendations from experienced, working level 
individuals as to how they would change future TRICARE MCS contracts. However, 
none of the surveys were returned with recommendations for contractual changes. 
Therefore, follow-up interviews were conducted. These phone interviews addressed more 
specific areas, such as size of the contracts, number of adjustment factors, capitation, and 
frequency ofBPAs. Suggestions were given in these specific areas as well as other areas. 
(b) Analysis of response data. 
Eleven telephone surveys and four follow-up interviews were conducted. 
Of the 15 total interviews, nine stated that the Government would benefit from having 
more, smaller contracts. The most common suggestion was to have one contract per 
region. The main reasons given were that smaller contracts would be more manageable, 
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easier to administer, and the adjustment information would be easier to compile and 
distribute. Region X, which shares one contract with Regions IX and XII, revealed that it 
could take over a month to get an administrative letter to the contractor~ because of the 
coordination difficulties with having more than one region on a single contract. Another 
reason given to support smaller contracts is that it would enhance competition because 
smaller MCS contractors would have the capability to bid, and possibly win these 
~ontracts. As it stands now, only massive health care network organizations have the 
necessary resources to bid successfully on contracts of such magnitude. Five of the nine 
who suggested smaller contracts, also addressed a down-side to smaller contracts. This is 
that coordination of consistent health care benefits to all beneficiaries would become 
difficult with several smaller contracts. A suggestion to remedy this problem was to write 
performance specifications vice detailed "how to" specifications and let the lead agents 
monitor performance. Why should we outline a specific process for contractors with 
extensive experience in health care delivery? Two individuals stated that another potential 
problem resulting from smaller contracts is that the contractors will lose economies of 
scale which are now being realized. 
One respondent suggested that the Government would benefit by having fewer, 
larger contracts. No supporting statements were provided as to why he made this 
suggestion. Five respondents stated that the contracts are the right size, but that the 
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Government needs more time to learn how to operate in the managed care arena. Two of 
these five respondents stated that the Government should consolidate the regions that now 
share contracts to mitigate the coordination problem. 
When asked about adjustment factors, no one felt that there needed to be more 
adjustment factors. Seven respondents felt that there should be fewer adjustment factors. 
Six out of these seven felt that the Government should move towards full capitation. 
Several ACOs stated that contractors incur significantly lower risk than would be incurred 
in a typical fixed price contract because of the adjustment factors. 
Eight of the eleven respondents felt it would be beneficial to conduct BP As more 
frequently. Some reasons given were that there would be less financial impact, fewer 
surprises, and fewer discrepancies between the adjustment factor numbers of the 
contractor, lead agent, and OASD (HA). The three other respondents felt that it might be 
beneficial to do adjustments more often, but were skeptical about the Government's 




V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
This chapter makes statements of conclusion to the primary and subsidiary thesis 
research questions. It also provides recommendations as to how the next generation of 
TRICARE contracts should be structured and present benefits and limitations of that 
structure. Finally, this chapter identifies areas for further research. 
rhe researcher bases these conclusions and recommendations on the literature review' 
initial interviews, survey results, and follow up interviews. 
A. CONCLUSIONS 
1. Primary Research Question. What are the unique characteristics of the 
TRICARE MCS Contracts, and are they functioning sufficiently to achieve the objectives 
of the TRICARE Program? 
The unique characteristics ofthe TRICARE MCS contracts identified include the 
Bid Price Adjustment and resource sharing processes. The BP A and resource sharing 
mechanisms are functioning sufficiently to achieve the overall objectives of the TRICARE 
Program of providing consistent, quality, an affordable health care to active duty military 
members, their families and retirees. This does not mean the processes function without 
difficulty or problems. Now that the Government has experience in the managed care 
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arena and historical data is being compiled, some of the characteristics ofboth the BPA 
and resource sharing processes can be changed so that contract administration can 
function better and health care can be delivered more smoothly. 
2. Subsidiary Question # 1. What is the objective of the TRICARE program, and 
how does the TRICARE program differ from past military health care programs? 
As identified in Chapter IT, OSD (HA) states that the objectives of the TRICARE 
Program are: 
a. Improving beneficiary access to care; 
b. Assuring the security of a high quality, consistent health care 
benefits for all MHS S beneficiaries, at low cost; 
c. Preserving choice for all non-active duty participants; and 
d. Containing overall DOD health care costs. 
TRICARE contracts are drafted to achieve these goals. 
The TRICARE Program differs from past military health care programs in several 
ways. DOD is trying to capitalize on the strengths of civilian health care plans and tailor 
those plans to fit the unique environment of the military. Traditionally, military health care 
plans for dependents and retirees who could not be accommodated in an MTF operated on 
a fee-for-service basis. That is, ifCHAMPUS eligible beneficiaries sought care from a 
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civilian provider, the Government would pay that provider a specific price for a specific 
service. However, there was no incentive for providers to limit the amount of care that 
they were providing military customers because the more care that was provided, the 
more money the provider received. Furthermore, there was no incentive for the military 
beneficiary to seek less care because the care was provided at little or no cost to them. 
Several CHAMPUS Reform Initiatives sought to implement managed care aspects 
of health care into the Military health care system. These initiatives created items such as 
the triple option program, Catchment Area Management (CAM), and the lead agent 
concept. TRICARE combined all of these items when it was launched on 8 September 
1994. 
3. Subsidiary Question #2. What challenges have ACOs, lead agents, and 
Contracting Officer's Technical Representatives encountered while administering the 
unique aspects of the TRICARE MCS contracts? 
The problems identified concerning the BP A and resource sharing were many. 
Concerning the BP A, the primary problem identified was that there was inadequate 
information flow between Government entities for the BPA process to function smoothly. 
One gentleman compared this problem to keeping a checkbook. A person might be very 
meticulous about writing down the amount for each check he writes, but the bank in 
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which the account is held could have different amounts recorded for those same checks. 
The second problem identified is that the BP A process is too complex. Specifically, there 
are too many adjustments encompassed in the BP A process. The information flow 
problem further complicates the BP A process. The final problem reported was that the 
MTFs do not have adequate incentives to cooperate with the MCS contractors because 
the savings from a reduction in the contract bid price do not flow to the MTF level. It is 
important to note that, although several problems were mentioned, most of the data 
gathered supported the conclusion that the BP A process is working as the Government 
intended, and the system is not "broken." However, there are improvements that can be 
made. 
Two of the problems identified ·with resource sharing relate directly to the BP A: 
MTFs have very little success in understanding how resource sharing agreements will 
affect the BPA; and MTFs do not have adequate incentives to cooperate with the MCS 
contractors because the savings realized from resource sharing agreements do not flow 
back to the MTF level. The third problem with resource sharing is that the Government 
does an inadequate job of financial analysis and, therefore, can not properly analyze 
resource sharing opportunities.. Again, as with the BP A process, it should be noted that 
most of the research suggests that resource sharing is working as the Government 
intended, but improvements can be made. 
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4. Subsidiary Question #3. What are the Government's [experienced regional 
staffs, OASD (HA), and COTRs] analysis, suggestions, and critiques? 
There were a numerous opinions voiced and suggestions made as to what changes 
were needed in the BP A process and resource sharing provision of the TRIC.ARE MCS 
contracts. However, answers became more vague when specific questions were addressed 
concerning how the necessary changes could be implemented. Despite the vagueness of 
the replies, several recurring themes were observed, from which suggestions and solutions 
could be drawn. 
There is a problem with the information flow between lead agents, MTFs, OASD 
(HA), and the contractor. Information from OASD (HA) is not distributed in a timely 
manner to lead agents and MTFs, which makes them reactive, vice proactive, in 
responding to changes indicated by the data. Furthermore, the data are often times 
provided in a form that results in difficulty in validation by the lead agents and MTFs. A 
major suggestion from Government personnel was to consolidate the several, Service-
specific data bases that are currently utilized into one. This would allow lead agents, who 
represent all of the Services within a region, to coordinate more effectively with the 
MTFs. 
Another problem Government personnel identified is the complexity of both 
resource sharing and the BP A process. There were several suggestions to remedy this 
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problem. One way is to simply eliminate several of the adjustment factors involve in the 
BP A. This would increase the risk incurred by the contractor, and the Government would 
likely pay for this in the contractor' s original bid price. However, a tremendous 
administrative burden would be lifted from the lead agents, and more resources could be 
directed to other areas of concern. Another way to address this problem is to eliminate 
adjustment factors altogether and capitate the contracts. This would further increase the 
contractor's risk. As discussed in Chapter II, there are several advantages and 
disadvantages to capitation as used in HMOs. The same apply to capitation of the 
TRICARE contracts. 
Some suggested that resource sharing agreements should be separated from the 
BP A process. This aspect will be implemented in the TRICARE MCS contract for 
Region I, II, and V. This contract is now in the RFP evaluation phase of the procurement 
process. 
There were also several suggestions to make the risk sharing corridor a more fair 
and equitable method to adjust the contract price. Most respondents recommended that 
the contractor should bear a greater burden for the losses and retain a greater portion of 
the gains. There were also a further suggestion to eliminate the tiered structure of the risk 
sharing corridors because it creates "backward" incentives. As now written, the contracts 
reduce the contractor's share of gains from 20 to ten percent, if those gains exceed 20 
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percent of the APHCSC. Most Government respondents felt that the contractor share of 
the gains should increase if the it strived to achieve greater savings. The POTGR creates 
the same kind of "backward" incentive because the contractor can act inefficiently and 
irresponsibly after this point is reached. 
5. Subsidiary Question #4. What other contractual mechanisms might be used, 
or how might current mechanisms be tailored, to facilitate contract administration? 
6. Subsidiary Question #5. How may this analysis help improve future TRICARE 
MCS contracts? 
Subsidiary questions #5 and #6 will be addressed in the recommendations section 
below. 
B. RECOMMENDATIONS 
1. Recommendation #1. Incorporate a standard data system to collect BPA 
data for all Services. The researcher agrees with suggestion made to consolidate the 
Service specific data bases into one. This data base must be available, with BP A data, on 
a real-time basis to MTFs, lead agents, OASD (HA), and the contractor. This will not 
only allow the lead agents and MTFs to become proactive to correct discrepancies, but it 
will also tremendously accellerate the process of validating the data once OASD (HA) 
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released final BP A numbers for each option period. Providing this information to the 
contractor affords it the opportunity to question any data prior to releasing the final BP A 
for each option period. Furthermore, it gives the contractor the feeling that the 
Government is being forthright and honest in its dealings. In the current system, the 
contractor may refute figures in the final BP A but not have any input until the process is 
complete. Although information should be provided to the contractor, it should be 
provided on a "read only" basis, to ensure there can be no alteration of the figures. 
2. Recommendation #2. Move significantly towards full capitation. Several 
lead agents suggested fully capitating the TRICARE MCS contractors. This would be 
inappropriate at the present time because it would place the contractor too much at risk 
with the unpredictable nature of the Military's population. Under a fully capitated system, 
a large, extended-period contingency operation could put severe financial strain on, or 
potentially bankrupt, a contractor. With a sudden decrease in population, the contractor 
would not be able to realize economies of scale that it predicted upon submission of its 
original bid price. Full capitation is not recommended for these reasons, unless an 
adjustment factor for force movements and population is included. All other adjustment 
factors should be eliminated because they are unnecessary, or they burden the process of 
contract administration. The contractor should be held at risk for these factors because 
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elimination of some will have a negligible effect and others, while they may. increase the 
contractor's bid price, represent risk that is inherent in fixed-price contracts. 
3. Recommendation #3. Educate Military personnel and require a minimum 
specified education level for MCS contractors. One problem identified for resource 
sharing is that Government personnel do not have the ability to do effective financial 
analysis in resource sharing opportunities. Resource sharing agreements are negotiated on 
the MTF level, yet lead agent staffs are receiving most of the education opportunities. 
Business education opportunities must be provided to MTF commanders, administrators, 
and physicians, so that they can make informed, efficient, and effective decisions. 
4. Recommendation #4. Alter the risk sharing structure in two ways: 
a. Keep it simple with one share ratio for overruns and one share 
ratio for underruns. 
b. Make the share ratio for both gains and losses shallower (65/35 for 
gains and 75/25 for losses). 
The researcher agrees with the assertion made by lead agent personnel that 
the risk sharing corridors may create contractor incentives that are inconsistent with 
Government desires. Therefore, it is recommended that the tiered aspect ofloss and gain 
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sharing corridors be eliminated. This includes eliminating the POTGR and the portion of 
total contractor responsibility in the loss sharing corridor, as well as the 90/10 share ratio 
in the gain sharing corridor. This change will not only eliminate the "backward" incentive, 
it will also create a simpler system, making business analysis easier to perform. 
During telephone interviews it was revealed that Government personnel felt 
gains favored the Government and losses favored the contractor. What was not actually 
stated but was sensed by the researcher during interviews, was the feeling that this slant 
toward one, or the other, party directly affected attitudes and performance negatively. 
The gain sharing structure, as currently designed, does not create a strong incentive for 
the contractor to achieve substantial savings. Furthermore, it creates an attitude, by the 
contractor, that the Government is not fair and honest in its dealings. This negatively 
affects the atmosphere during any necessary negotiations or meetings. At worst it could 
influence the customer service provided to TRICARE beneficiaries. Likewise the loss 
sharing category does not create a strong enough incentive for the contractor to save 
money. Furthermore, it produces an attitude, by the Government, that the contractor is 
lazy and non-caring. 
Making the gain sharing ratio shallower allows the contractor to keep a 
greater portion of the savings, and creates an incentive to achieve greater savings. 
Furthermore, it relays to the contractor that Government is willing to work with it to 
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achieve the goal oflowering overall health care costs. Making the loss sharing ratio 
shallower will hold the contractor more accountable for losses incurred and create an 
incentive to spend efficiently. Moreover, it could change the Government's attitude by 
making it realize that the Contractor is striving to save because it has a significant stake in 
the losses. 
5. Recommendation #5. Utilize performance specifications. 
As one respondent to the survey stated "Why should we tell the contractor how to 
do things, when we can tell them what we want and simply monitor results [Engelhart, 
1996]?" The current TRICARE contracts contain detailed specifications that direct to the 
contractor precise procedures for providing care, customer service, and other aspects. 
This limits the contractor's innovation. Furthermore, it slows and restricts the 
implementation process of many new, money-saving processes by requiring new 
proposals to be submitted if the new process does not conform to the Government 
prescribed process. Time and money is wasted in this manner. 
C. SUMMARY 
Prior to CHAMPUS in 1956, MTFs provided health care to active duty military 
members, their families, and retirees. It was an exception, rather than the rule, for 
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dependents or retirees to seek medical care in the civilian health care sector. Today, 
seeking civilian care is the standard for dependents and retirees. This trend has been 
caused by the closure of many MTFs due to military downsizing and the corresponding 
use of civilian care facilities. 
Accordingly, DOD health care costs are escalating rapidly. Managed care is one 
way to control costs effectively while maintaining, or increasing, quality and accessibility 
qf care. The TRICARE program has moved CHAMPUS from being a fee-for-service 
system to a managed care organization. 
The Department of Defense understands that to run a smaller more efficient health 
care system effectively, it must continue to pursue managed care. TRICARE must 
continually improve on health care delivery methods. This starts by implementing an 
effective, well-constructed contract. 
The bid price adjustment mechanism was designed so that inherent risk in the 
TRICARE contracts could be shared fairly between the contractor and the Government. 
The resource sharing feature was designed so that the contractor and the Government 
could utilize available resources effectively to lower the overall price to the Government. 
These mechanisms are unique to TRICARE MCS contracts, and they are fulfilling their 
intended purposes, albeit not to everyone's satisfaction. However, as more historical 
financial data are available, upon which contractors can base their proposed bid prices, 
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these mechanisms will no longer be necessary as now structured. Instead, the Government 
should move to a system of capitated care and include an adjustment factor for major 
force-level population fluctuations within a region. This would put the contractors in the 
same position of risk found in their non-DOD managed care contracts. 
D. AREAS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
The following are possible areas where further research could be accomplished in 
the area ofTRICARE contracting: 
1. Analyze the changes that are taking place in the RFP for 
Regions I, II, and V. Determine what financial impact these changes will 
have on MTFs and overall DOD health care costs. 
2. Develop performance work statements for the next generation 
ofTRICARE MCS contracts. 
3. Develop further economic and other incentives that DOD could 
provide to motivate health care providers to reduce cost and maintain 
quality. 
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4. Conduct a study which focuses on quality issues. Determine 



















LIST OF ACRONYMS 
AD:MINISTRATIVE CONTRACTING OFFICER 
ACTIVE DUTY F AM1L Y MEMBER 
(FORMERLY DEPENDENTS) 
ANNUAL PLANNING FIGURE 
ADJUSTED PROPOSED HEALTH CARE 
SERVICES COST 
ADJUSTED PROPOSED HEALTH CARE 
SERVICES PRICE 
BEST AND FINAL OFFER 
BID PRICE ADJUSTMENT 
BASE REALIGNMENT AND CLOSURE 
CATCHMENT AREA MANAGEMENT 
CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE 
CIVILIAN HEALTH AND MEDICAL PROGRAM 
OF THE UNIFORMED SERVICES 
CONTRACTING OFFICER'S TECHNICAL 
REPRESENTATIVE 
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CPIRI CHAMPUS PRICE INFLATION 
REIMBURSEMENT INDEX 
CRI CHAMPUS REFORM INITIATIVE 
DCP DATA COLLECTION PERIOD 
DEERS DEFENSE ENROLLMENT ELIGIBILITY 
REPORTING SYSTEM 
DOD DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE 
GAO GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE 
GDP GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT 
HM:O HEALTH MAINTENANCE ORGANIZATION 
MCS MANAGED CARE SUPPORT 
MHSS MILITARY HEALTH SERVICES SYSTEM 
MTF MILITARY TREATMENT FACILITY 
NADD NON ACTIVE DUTY FAMILY MEMBER 
(FORMERLY DEPENDENT) 
NAS NON-AVAILABILITY STATEMENT 
OASD(HA) OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF 
DEFENSE FOR HEALTH AFFAIRS 
OPV OUTPATIENT VISITS 
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OSD OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE 
PCM PRIMARY CARE MANAGER 
PCO PROCURING CONTRACTING OFFICER 
POTGR POINT OF TOTAL GOVERNMENT 
RESPONSffiiLITY 
PPO PREFERRED PROVIDER ORGANIZATION 
RFP REQUEST FOR PROPOSAL 
RSA RESOURCE SHARING AGREEMENT 
RWP RELATIVE WEIGHTED PRODUCT 
TFMEEP TRICARE FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT 
EXECUTIVE EDUCATION PROGRAM 
TRICARE TRI-SERVICES COORDINATED CARE 
TSO TRICARE SUPPORT OFFICE 
VTF VOLUME TRADE-OFF FACTOR 
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